Speech
of
His Excellency Fidel V. Ramos
President of the Philippines
At the dinner with participants in the Manila Meeting

[Delivered in Malacañang, Manila, May 31, 1994]

‘Southeast Asia 2000’
and beyond

RURAL FILIPINOS often say the future is like a hen’s egg: it will either hatch or spoil.

In this sense, Southeast Asia owes you, the conferees, a vote of thanks. Because, by your thinking and dialoguing together, you are incubating our region’s prospects: to make sure they hatch into the kind of future we all want for our peoples.

If increasing anarchy in Bosnia and West Africa is a premonition of mankind’s future, East Asia’s increasing prosperity—in its post-Cold War stability—is another, more optimistic indication of mankind’s prospects.

The end of the Cold War has also given us in Southeast Asia the chance to take command of our own future.

The power balance in Southeast Asia

For instance, the United States Navy’s withdrawal from Subic Bay on November 24,1992, ended an era during which—for 421 uninterrupted years—there was no single day that foreign troops were not based on Philippine soil.

Our country’s emergence from under America’s wings has given us Filipinos the opportunity to make our own history. Like any other coming of age, self-determination—particularly in a multipolar world—is complex and difficult, but it is also rewarding.

All of you are keenly aware of this new complexity in the regional power balance. As one of your colleagues, Peter Ho of Singapore, has pointed out:

“We can no longer expect the United States to continue to underpin by itself the security of the East Asian region. But there will be difficulties with either Japan or China taking up the slack—Japan because of the Pacific War, and China because of the historical tributary relationship and the Chinese populations in Southeast Asia.”

“Thus [Ho concludes] our only recourse is to strengthen our own network of linkages.”

Other impulses to unification

There are many positive as well as negative impulses driving our countries together. For example:

We must keep Southeast Asia nuclear-free in a world where the proliferation of nuclear weapons may now be the trend.

We must prevent any flare-up in the South China Sea—along the sealanes so vital to all Asia-Pacific countries. In that regard, I have, as you know, proposed demilitarization and a freeze on all destabilizing activities.

Above all, we must prevent the resurgence of narrow nationalisms in Southeast Asia. We must see to it that the small conflicts are resolved without delay so that these do not escalate into bigger ones.

Adopting the region’s interests for our own

I understand that some form of unification may be our logical next step as a regional grouping—but moving toward it will still take all the political will, all the collective sense of purpose, and all the idealism of our political leaders.

And the reason is that not every country will benefit equally from any form of unification right from the start.

In their dealings, as we know, states usually recognize no motive higher than their own national interest. But in this case, we must do more than look after the component interests of the member-nations.

From the very beginning of this venture, all our countries must adopt as their own the interests of the region as a whole.

If we do not take up “regionism” as our separate—and collective-cause, then any effort at unification will stumble along the way as some proposed regional unions elsewhere are experiencing.

If we do not agree there is a higher purpose than the immediate national interest which unification will serve, then we may be debating ceaselessly over the fine print—over every little detail, every little concession.

At that stage, Southeast Asian unity may become a product of our least common denominator—instead of welling up effortlessly from the ties of blood, language and culture.

The East Timor issue

On the East Timor issue, my Government has been taking some hard knocks in the name of “regionism.”

If we had approached this problem entirely from the viewpoint of our immediate national interest—if we had approached it purely from the viewpoint of our Constitution—then we would have found it easy to allow that meeting to just take place.

But we chose to approach the problem concurrently from the viewpoint of our ASEAN commitments: in dealing with it, we chose to relate ASEAN bilateral and regional solidarity as primary considerations in upholding our national interest.

And we decided that we cannot allow the Philippines to be used as a platform for political propaganda against an ASEAN partner and brother-nation. So we are patiently taking our lumps—in the media here at home and abroad as well as from some of our own citizens—while firmly doing what we think is in our own national interest, which includes our desire for “regionism.”

To sum up: I urge you not to underestimate the difficulties of unification. But neither should you allow these difficulties to deter you from the mission you have taken up—as citizens of your countries and as Southeast Asians.

We Filipinos have a saying—“Ang anumang agwat ay di mararating kung titingnan lamang at di lalakarin.”

(“However the distance, we shall never get there—if all we do is look, and not start walking.”)

In this spirit, the time has come to add some legwork to our talking, thinking and dreaming about “Southeast Asia 2000” and beyond.