Speech
of
His Excellency Fidel V. Ramos
President of the Philippines
At the Roundtable Conference organized by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and the Institute for Strategic and Development Studies

Delivered at the Hotel Inter-Continental Manila, Makati City, December 2, 1994]

Building the structure
of ASEAN security

THIS IS a timely exercise—this roundtable on ASEAN security convened only a week after the Fourth APEC Summit in Manila—and only two days after this year’s informal meeting among ASEAN’s heads of government in Jakarta.

In our world today, economics and security are like two rivers—intersecting and flowing into one another.

At the APEC summit, we dealt with economic challenges and opportunities in the Asia-Pacific. But, as you obviously noted, we stressed in our concluding Declaration the crucial role that “an environment of stability and security” plays in our effort to attain APEC’s goals.

By the same token, recent security forums have acknowledged the role that economic development plays in bringing about regional stability and security.

Security with others

As one expert on Asia-Pacific affairs has noted, the emphasis on economics has reduced regional tensions, normalized relations among countries and intensified the search for cooperation on security issues.

To say this is not to suggest that the economic growth being experienced by many countries in Southeast Asia has removed security concerns from the regional agenda. It means merely that we are today learning to approach these issues in a different light.

As we in ASEAN have lately been saying, security in our time is achieved “with others—not against others.”

This idea that security is best attained cooperatively enables us to see through the complexities of the many issues facing us.

The gravest of these are disputes over territories and borders, the growing military power of some countries including nuclear weapons, and anxieties raised by the recession of the superpowers. And then there are “unconventional” security problems arising from illegal migration, smuggling, piracy, terrorism and drug trafficking.

The architecture of regional security

In analyzing the security challenges facing regions, experts use the term “architecture” to describe the processes and systems that must be designed and erected. A process that would result in greater security for an entire region is not just a set of desired goals. It must be a veritable structure in itself—consisting of many building blocks and elements.

Because regional security involves diverse nations, the effort is never simple. It evolves from the convergence of many efforts—on many fronts and many tracks. Such a security strategy—it has been suggested—should closely parallel the region’s experience in economic cooperation.

In both APEC and ASEAN, the outcomes we see today result from years of patient and painstaking construction.

Building for regional security requires the same “patient, sustained and diversified effort.” For this roundtable, I would venture as a starting point the course and progress of the ASEAN dialogue on regional security.

It was in 1991 when ASEAN first began this initiative—by deciding that its Postministerial Conference, until then restricted to economic issues—should be enlarged to cover security questions as well.

That simple step began a discussion of security issues not only among ASEAN member states but also between ASEAN and its traditional dialogue partners—the United States, the European Union, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and South Korea—and then with Russia, China, Vietnam and North Korea.

After confidence-building meetings in 1992 and 1993 (which took the form of a series of bilateral conversations), all the parties in the Postministerial Conference agreed to create an ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) on security issues, beginning in 1994.

The remarkable correspondence between the participants in ARF and the membership of APEC underscores what I have always believed—that APEC and ARF complement each other perfectly.

The bubble of stability

If APEC is to realize its potentials, our countries must keep first of all the peace among ourselves. Any explosion of violence—in any part of the Asia-Pacific—will burst the bubble of stability that keeps its “economic miracle” going.

Alternatively, even if the military balance holds, it will be easy for unrestrained economic competition to degenerate into “beggar-my-neighbor” policies; for greed and speculation to ruin our interconnected markets.

At the Jakarta Information ASEAN Summit, the heads of government issued instructions to our ministers to work out the modalities of the ASEAN Foundation and ASEAN Social Fund to finance the cooperative projects of ASEAN in human and social development. The Philippines has been a leading proponent of both these projects.

We asked our ministers and officials to hasten the review of the protocol to the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone Treaty, which we had signed in Bangkok last December, so as to expedite the accession of the nuclear weapon states to the protocol.

I brought up the problem of the rapid increase in the number of nuclear power plants in our part of the world and the need to address the problems of nuclear-plant safety and the safe disposal of nuclear waste, perhaps through an “Asiatom,” which I had proposed last May in Tokyo as a body to oversee the handling of these serious problems on an organized regional basis.

The overriding challenge before us today is to make all our countries both richer and safer. This conference focuses on security and order in ASEAN, but we must also keep in mind the wider sphere of the Asia-Pacific.

That regional security is indivisible is in fact suggested by the other half of your topic—which is “The Role of External Powers.”

It is customary today to speak of the success of the ASEAN states in their drive for modernization. But not all countries in Southeast Asia have made that transition. Some are still struggling to restore their economies to the path of growth—or even to recover fully from the wounds of conflict.

Nor have all our leaders resolved the contradiction between the interdependence needed by the regional economy and the “we-against-the-world” kind of nationalism that some governments see as a necessary binder for their plural societies.

Convergence toward a global economy

But one fact is clear. All our countries are converging toward a single global economy and toward the common dream of economic modernization.

This tide of convergence raises the hope that the time will soon come—when all Asia-Pacific countries become part of one great zone of peace—when our mutual security will depend no longer on arms and alliances but on peaceful commerce and integration in the Asia-Pacific community for the benefit of all who live there.

But until that zone is in place, we must brace ourselves for a regional environment that will have its share of tension, difficulties and disputes.

We must pay particular attention to the situation of the developing nations. In a significant way, their concept of national security must vary from that of the more mature and more prosperous states.

In much of Southeast Asia—the Philippines included—internal weaknesses in the form of poverty and social inequity still must be overcome.

During the Cold War period, these weaknesses—because they breed urban unrest, insurgency and separatism—had been even more dangerous for the Philippines than any outside threat.

Social cohesion as security

This is why one of the first things my Government did—when it took office in mid-1992—was to offer an honorable peace settlement to our military rebels, communist insurgents and Muslim secessionists, which consists not only of an active role in the political mainstream but of economic benefits and cultural recognition on the enlarged table of national development.

And that is why my Government defines national security in terms of political stability, economic development and social cohesion.

Only now—with the bipolar superpower balance replaced by an even less-stable configuration of big-power relationships—only now—with our economies growing steadily—only now do we in Southeast Asia have the leisure to rethink our security concerns.

The regional environment remains unsettled—because the big powers have yet to clear up their interests and intentions. A balance has yet to be established among the big powers with interests in the Asia-Pacific region.

The lingering enmities in the Korean Peninsula could alter the entire security equation in Northeast Asia.

China’s intentions in the South China Sea—how a new Russia will evolve from the ideological ruins of the Soviet Union—and how Japan can turn into a truly self-reliant nation in defense matters—these too remain unclear.

There is an inherent anomaly and anachronism—similar to the old Allied effort to keep apart the two Germanys—in Japan’s remaining a strategic client of the United States.

This can only fan an unhealthy kind of nationalism in a nation acutely aware of its political uniqueness and economic power—increasing the danger that the bitter disputes over trade between the two countries would spill over into their security relationship.

How China exercises its economic, political and military power must also concern us all—and none more so than we Southeast Asians who are its closest neighbors.

China’s rapidly expanding economy will unavoidably generate political and military pressures on the Asia-Pacific—even assuming that Beijing made no effort to build its capability to project power beyond its borders.

China and the Asia-Pacific community

The opposite possibility—of China’s economic failure—is, if anything, even more alarming.

The Allies in Western Europe solved a roughly similar problem by integrating postwar Germany into a European Union. So must we endeavor to integrate China into the Asia-Pacific Community—economically through APEC and politically through the ASEAN Regional Forum—if we are to have enduring regional stability.

The most immediate of East Asian anxieties is the widespread fear that the United States will revert to isolationism—which has in fact characterized America’s foreign policy throughout much of its history.

But the tilt of its population away from its Atlantic Coast, the influx of Asian migrants and the weight of its Asia-Pacific economic interests have made the United States more and more an Asia-Pacific player. Thus it must regard as a direct threat to its own interests the military domination by a single power in our part of the world.

The tyranny of distance

Since 1898 the United States had located its western strategic frontiers in the Philippines. But now the tyranny of distance—the expanse of the vast Pacific—separates it from the field in East Asia.

For this reason, “forward deployment” must remain the core of its political and security strategy in all of Asia and the Pacific Rim.

Forward deployment will not merely enable the United States to deter an East Asian conflict. It also supports the strategic tradeoff Washington proposes—which is that East Asia embrace the United States as an economic partner—to ensure its continued strong influence in the security environment of the Asia-Pacific.

We of the Philippines have no problems with this proposition—that East Asians prove to Americans that the United States can share in Asia-Pacific prosperity—since we do not regard economic competition as winner take all.

Our view is that a “win-win” outcome can result—with long-term benefits for all. On the issue of prepositioning American materiel, no large ASEAN country has as yet offered forward-basing arrangements to the US.

In my view, this caution arises partly from a lesson remembered from the colonial period. Every Southeast Asian culture has a variant of the Malay proverb, “When elephants fight, the mousedeer between them is killed.”

But it also results from an appreciation of the opportunity that the post-Cold War security environment offers Southeast Asia—to become the nuclear-free “zone of peace, freedom and neutrality” that ASEAN has envisioned from its beginnings.

Under this reasoning, the dismantling of land-based American naval and air forces from Southeast Asia removes a potential provocation to ASEAN’s giant neighbor—and invites China to live and let live with its Southeast Asian neighbors.

ASEAN countries are betting that economic interdependence and mutual benefit can preempt the rise of old-fashioned political antagonisms.

In the Asia-Europe Meeting—ASEM for short—which first convened in Bangkok last March, we have the beginnings of a mechanism for engaging the European Union in East Asia.

Gatherings like this conference on ASEAN security nurture this new framework for Asia-Europe cooperation.

From our vantage point, we see the European Union as still largely turned inward. Unfortunately, its trade with ASEAN and its investments in Southeast Asia are minuscule—compared with their potentials.

That is why we welcomed so warmly Chancellor Helmut Kohl in Southeast Asia, who came last month to the Philippines with a large business delegation.

A code of conduct in the South China Sea

Not only do our fast-growing economies promise new opportunities for profit and growth for Europe’s corporations. Europe has technologies in a wide variety of fields that it can share with Southeast Asia for our mutual benefit. Beyond these are cultural values that our two regions could better understand and appreciate from each other—for our long-term economic and security interests.

The success of the recent APEC summit and the three-day visit to the Philippines of President Jiang Zemin should help reinforce ASEAN optimism that we will find a solution to the territorial disputes over the South China Sea.

Chinese officials continue to insist on their country’s “indisputable sovereignty.” But they now declare that their country is ready to approach territorial disputes and conflict over maritime rights and interests on the basis of international law—including UNCLOS, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea—and that the issue could be discussed in China’s meetings with ASEAN, consistent with the 1992 Manila ASEAN Declaration.

The search for a solution acceptable to all is enhanced by an agreement between Philippine and Chinese senior officials on a code of conduct in the South China Sea—pledging both sides to resolve territorial disputes without the use or threat of force.

Certainly, the atmosphere is better now than it was in early 1995. And the visit of President Jiang has certainly helped.

One-on-one dialogues

We have suggested that the Chinese consider the value of both bilateral and multilateral talks—with the other claimants and within the ASEAN Regional Forum—seeing mat one-on-one dialogues and group discussions support each other in resolving disputes of this sort.

In my view, all this underscores an important principle in building for security and order in Southeast Asia and in the Asia Pacific—that we draw all countries into the network of collaboration by showing what can be gained by working harmoniously with neighbors.

In the search for regional security, there is a major role to be played by the “middle powers” in the Asia-Pacific. The ASEAN states together with Australia and New Zealand have shown they need not be passive spectators—hapless mousedeer—in the interplay among the great powers in the region.

We have shown that we in the “in between” can be active players—if not in economic and military might, then in the power of ideas and in the area of moral persuasion.

We have proved this in bringing to resolution some of the thorny questions in the former Indochinese states. And in the ASEAN Regional Forum, we have erected an instrument for security consultation and cooperation.

By strengthening our own linkages and pooling our own talents, capabilities and resources, we can have a strong voice in crafting the future of the Asia-Pacific.

In every regional council, we can speak for moderation, fair play, information and technology sharing, and mutual respect.

Shared strategic interests

And cohesive action begins with a recognition of the community of our strategic interests.

This recognition that the middle powers must band together is what led Vietnam to join ASEAN. We now expect ASEAN to complete uniting the natural cluster of 10 Southeast Asian countries well before the turn of the century.

Our impulse to unification—expressed by the terms “ASEAN plus three” or SEA-Ten—will be particularly salutary to the future of Southeast Asia. None of our 10 countries can stand up separately to the intense competition of the global economy and the power politics that might yet embroil the Asia-Pacific of the future.

But united, we can face outside pressures and shape our future according to our collective aspirations. United, SEA-Ten can play an even bigger role in world affairs than it does now.

We of ASEAN are encouraged that our fundamental negotiating principles of consultation and consensus can be effective in fostering greater cooperation among states, be it on matters of economics or security. These principles have already become standard operating procedures for both APEC and the ASEAN Regional Forum.

In deciding to build political trust first—rather than coming to grips immediately with specific disputes—in working patiently, incrementally and informally—keeping in mind that the process of reaching an agreement is important in itself—both APEC and the ASEAN Regional Forum have gained a unique flexibility and continuity.

This kind of decision making may be slow, subtle and indirect, but we believe—and we have been vindicated in this belief—that it produces agreements that are unforced, nonconfrontational, virtually self-policing and enduring.

This process we have applied with success in the Philippines setting vis-à-vis insurgents, separatists and military rebels.

Thus through APEC and ARF, we nurture a quiet confidence that the entire Asia-Pacific region can grow toward a true community.

To sum up, I believe that building the structure of ASEAN security will benefit from a strategy that closely parallels what we have done on the economic front—both in ASEAN and in APEC—step-by-step, confidence-measure upon confidence-measure, success upon success.

People-to-people interaction

As we of ASEAN have widened our collaborative institutions to make political, economic, social and cultural cooperation possible, so must we follow the same track in dealing with our problems of security.

As we have focused on building political trust and people-to-people interaction in our economic and social development programs, so in security must we build trust and harmony.

As we have fostered economic interdependence at a pace comfortable for every member, so in security must we build incrementally—keeping in mind that the process of reaching agreement is important in itself.

In the last analysis, building a structure of Southeast Asian security is founded on building a community of nations. And we have a real chance to nurture both prosperity and peace in our region because—now more than ever—all of Southeast Asia recognizes how high the stakes are.

Now, for the first time in its history, Southeast Asia is becoming a power in the world—and in its own right.

As we of ASEAN anticipate the 30th anniversary of ASEAN’s founding on August 8, 1997, we can look back with pride and a sense of achievement on how former colonized countries in Southeast Asia can unify and integrate in order to win the future.

These to me are what enduring peace and sustainable development are all about—for ASEAN, for the Asia-Pacific, for Asia-Europe and for the world.